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BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, VOL.XI. 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE. Proceedings of 
Section L, 1969, American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. Edited by RJ .  Seeger and R.S. Cohen, Synthese Library 
Vol. 58, Dordrecht-Holland/Boston-U.S.A., D. Reidel Publishing Co., 
1974, ix + 545 pp. 
The twenty-eight papers included in this collection cover a wide 
range of topics, from Leonardo Da Vinci's paintings to a different 
style of "highly condensed object" - the so-called "white dwarfs" 
of astronomy. I imagine that few people will have the interests and 
the competence to take them easily through this book. It is there. 
fore not clear to me that these proceedings are very usefully published 
together. There is no obvious connecting theme, except insofar as in 
every case some aspect of either science or a scientist (e.g. Leonardo) 
is dealt with. The title of the volume is misleading, for these are by 
no means all philosophical papers or all of special relevance to 
philosophy; moreover on the whole the philosophy that there is is 
unimpressive. In particular, many points are too unclear or too 
sketchily made to be very exciting. This is therefore not a book 
I am inclined to recommend highly either as a whole or in part to 
a philosophical audience. And in general it seems to me that these 
papers are too brief for both depth and clarity. However, particular 
people might f'md certain pieces useful. In what follows, therefore, 
I note the contents of the book section by section and give brief 
accounts of some somewhat arbitrarily chosen individual papers. 
1. Perhaps by way of encouragement to the reader, the book begins 
with five papers which in effect celebrate the versatility of one man, 
Leonardo da Vinci, on the occasion of the four hundred and fiftieth 
anniversary of his death. This part forms a little 'book' of 115 pages 
and 55 plates of paintings, technical drawings, and doodles. The 
papers include "An Aspect of Leonardo's Painting" (John Shapley); 
"On the Physical Insights of Leonard&' (Raymond J. Seeger); 
"Leonardo as Military Engineer" (Bern Dibner); and "Leonardo 
da Vinci and the Beginnings of Factories with a Central Source of 
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Power" (Ladislao Reti). In the fifth paper, "Leonardo da Vinci 
and the Sublimatory Process", Raymond Stites critically considers 
Freud's judgment on Leonardo that "so universal in his many 
interests, (he) avoided all investigations in the realm of psychology". 
Stites argues that Leonardo had deep interests in and insights into 
psychology. We are referred to Stites's translation of the Codex 
Trivulzianus which includes forty-five "word lists with strongly 
affective or emotional overtones". Stites infers that Leonardo 
"observed and used what we today call chain-association, thereby 
inventing for himself a kind of self-psychoanalysis with art-thera- 
peutic overtones." 
2. In Part II, "Physics and the Explanation of Life", Eugene Wigner's 
paper expresses the views on the mind-body problem of an eminent 
physicist. Perhaps his most intriguing claim here concerns physics. 
While many philosophers now are busy arguing away the 'contents 
of consciousness' in favour of the 'physical', Wigner claims that 
"modern microscopic physics at present uses 'observations' or 
'perceptions' as primitive concepts." Wigner has argued this claim 
elsewhere; his remarks here are tantalizingly brief. As he states it 
"the basic principles of physics, embodied in quantum 
mechanical theory, are dealing with connections between 
observations, that is contents of consciousness.. ,  the neces- 
sity of the formulation in terms of perceptions, and hence 
the reference to consciousness, is characteristic of quantum 
mechanics compared with classical physics." (p. 123) 
Wigner is again concise on the ability of physics to explain 'contents 
of consciousness.' As 1 understand him, he believes that physics 
may well be adequate one day to explain situations involving life 
and consciousness: but this physics will be a transformed one. 
Just as the most recent extension of Newtonian physics - quantum 
mechanics - uses 'observations' as 'primitive concepts', so a further 
extension of physics may be hoped to give deeper insights into 
mental processes; laws era kind presently unknown will be formu- 
lated for 'observations', which will no longer be the primitive terms 
of the theory. 
In the other paper in this part, "New Concepts in the Evolution 
of Complexity", J. Bronowski counters certain arguments for 
vitalism, the belief that "the laws of physics which hold in the 
inanimate world will not suffice for the explanation of life." A 
number of Bronowski's claims are of the form "we do not at present 
know enough a b o u t . . ,  to say whether it can be explained by - " 
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The 'new concepts' alluded to in the title are "stratified stability" 
and "unbounded plan". Evolution is an "open and unbounded 
plan" in which the errors which destroy the individual are also the 
origin of species. Polanyi has argued that the increasing complexity 
of species in the course of evolution supports vitalism. Bronowski 
attempts to explain this increase in terms of two empirical prin- 
ciples, (1) natural selection in favour of genetic variability, (2) strati- 
fied stability: "the building up of stable configurations does have 
a direction, the more complex stratum built on the next lower." 
Against the vitalist, Bronowski argues that chance is 'constrained 
to work' precisely by moving from simple to complex structures. 
Finally, he considers how it can be possible for complex arrange- 
ments to establish themselves at all, given the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. 
3. Part 1II consists of one essay in the history of science: Martin 
Klein's "Boltzmann, Monocycles, and Mechanical Explanation", 
the 1969 George Sarton Memorial Lecture. Professor Klein counters 
Whitehead's description of the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
as "an age of successful scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed by much 
thought beyond the conventions". He notes that the "tradition of 
mechanical explanation" was coming to an end in those years; 
a number of debates among scientists reflected difficulties in this 
tradition. "Questions of fundamental principle drew an unusual 
amount of attention in this stodgy era". Ludwig Boltzmann figures 
as an ardent spokesman for the dying tradition. 
4. Part IV is devoted to "Current Problems of Cosmology". The 
'laws' of physics, already given a temporary and limited look (as they 
now stand) in Wigner's paper, are 'attacked' from another point 
of view in Peter Bergmann's "Cosmology as a science". Bergmann 
argues that whereas studies focussing on the nature and history 
of the universe may extrapolate from "laws of nature that have 
been obtained on the terrestrial scale", they may also serve to cast 
doubt on the finality of those 'laws'. A series of brief glimpses 
into contemporary cosmology are given in these papers, which will 
be opaque in parts to those knowing little physics. 
The other papers are "Open or Closed?" (Philip Morrison); 
"Cosmic Evolution" (David Layser); "Highly Condensed Objects" 
(Fred Hoyle); "The Case for a Hierarchical Cosmology . . . "  (G. de 
Vaucouleurs); and "From Mendeleev's Atom to Collapsing Star" 
(J A. Wheeler). 
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5. Part V is entitled "Objectivity and Anthropology", and the five 
papers are roughly on this one theme, though they do not refer to 
one another. In the first paragraph of her "Objectivity in the Social 
Sciences" Judith Buber Agassi notes and deplores a trend current 
in American sociology, rejection of "the basic condition for objec- 
tive social science", that is, a rejection of "the assumption of the 
unity of mankind - both intellectual and moral". According to the 
view she opposes "nothing can take the place of first-hand experi- 
ence: only women can understand women's problems" (and so on). 
Now, Agassi spends no time investigating what may lie behind 
slogans of the type cited. Suppose they express the view that if one 
wants to know what it is like to be a person of a certain sort one 
must either be a person of that sort or at least be dependent upon 
such people for one's knowledge, for instance one must ask them 
about their experiences. If this were the point of  such slogans in 
their context, then they would not seem necessarily to conflict 
with the idea of the "intellectual and moral" unity of  mankind. 
For given that there is ~rivileged access' of a sort to some experi- 
ences and that a scientist may have to ask the 'privileged' about 
their lives and learn from them, a single set of moral and intellectual 
standards could still be applicable to these experiences. Agassi 
does not sufficiently clarify the nature of the view she is attack- 
ing or the view she is defending, or explain the relationship between 
them. Nor does she mount a sustained attack, but in the bulk of her 
paper presents a brief historical sketch of attempts in American 
sociology to "solve the problem of value", citing once again at 
the end the current trends she deplores. This paper is sensible and 
serious in tone but, as I have indicated, lacks depth or precision 
in argument. 
I.C. Jarvie (in "On the Objectivity of Anthropology") states 
plainly that objectivity "consists in placing checks on bias" and 
claims that the best way to do this is to live up to Popperian canons 
of scientific method: to subject our ideas to "the standard of inter- 
subjective and repeated testing". Jarvie asks whether it is true in 
anthropology, as in natural science, that "to all intenls and purposes" 
the same descriptive material could have been collected by anyone. 
According to Jarvie, most anthropologists would say no. This 
at first struck me as an unlikely claim about most anthropologists, 
but I note that Jarvie's question seems likely to attract opposite 
answers, depending on which of two possible construals is made. 
Thus consider: (1) Was the same material (e.g. social structure, laws) 
there to be discovered by whoever was adept or curious or cour- 
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ageous or charming enough to discover it? (2) Is it the case that 
anyone at all could have had enough wit, courage, etc. to discover 
the social structure, and so on? I would myself expect most anthro- 
pologists to say 'yes' to (1) but 'no' to (2). That Jarvie in fact has 
construal (2) in mind is perhaps evidenced by his later claim that 
machines could not do social science, because they cannot enter 
into social relationships like talking. A negative answer to (2) would 
still indicate a "profound personal equation" in anthropology, 
if not so profound as a negative answer to (1). (In contrast, physicists 
hardly need to ingratiate themselves with the particles they are 
investigating.) Jarvie would seem to be right in averring that the 
"personal equation" of anthropology as expressed in a negative 
answer to (2) at least does not preclude its objectivity in his sense. 
Towards the end of his paper Jarvie juxtaposes two claims rather 
paradoxically. First, he indicates that objectivity is attained once 
the best that can be done by way of testing claims has been done. 
This seems fair enough, given his account of objectivity. But, second, 
he notes with equanimity that little is in fact ever done to test the 
accuracy of anthropological field reports. He does not say that 
such tests are, either in principle or in practice, impossible, but 
justifies the lack of checks in a very peculiar way. Checks, Jarvie 
claims, would harm a fieldworker's dignity, and moreover (and 
I quote) "if he lies or misperceives, so what?" One would have 
thought that if the importance of anthropological truth has to be 
impugned, there will not be much dignity left in any anthropological 
field work. The importance of anthropological truth aside, are 
objectivity and lack of testing really opposed, as Jarvie's drift seems 
to have it? Perhaps at least checking by another anthropologist 
is not necessary to free results from bias, perhaps even the replica- 
tion of an observation of one's own is not essential to objectivity. 
Then we could conceivably have truth, objectivity, and the 'dignity' 
of not being checked on all at once. These suggestions are implicit 
in Anthony Leeds' paper " 'Subjective' and 'Objective' in Social 
Anthropological Epistemology". 
Leeds argues that, according to one conception, the subjective- 
objective dichotomy is that between unique and replicable sensa- 
tions, but that it is better to see all sensation and experience as 
'objective', in that "something is observed by someone". Anthro- 
pology, at any rate, accepts dreams and visions as real data. The 
locus of 'subjectivity' - as something problematic - is not the 
irreplicable sensation but "the act of giving meaning, especially 
evaluative meaning, to experience and observation". It turns out that 
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this is not such a problem in anthropology, Leeds claims: 
anthropologists, immersing themselves in exotic cultures, tend to 
avoid ethnocentrism and "axiological infusions" in their results. 
It looks as if Leeds disagrees with Judith Agassi on the 'moral 
unity of  mankind' and disagrees with Jarvie as to the importance 
to objectivity of  some measure of  replicability of the data used. 
But it is hard to say since none of these authors make their central 
ideas and theses sufficiently clear and precise. The other papers in 
this rather disappointing section are Jacob W. Gruber, "Acquired 
Models and the Modification of Anthropological Evidence" and 
Paul W. Collins, "The Present Status of Anthropology as an Explana- 
tory Science". 
6. Part Vl, "Comparative History and Sociology of Science" 
includes "Scientific Concepts and Social Structure in Ancient 
Greece" (K.H. Niebyl); "Algebre et Linguistique: l'Analyse Com- 
binatoire dans la Science Arabe" (Roshdi Rashed); "On pursuing the 
unattainable" (J. Agassi); and "Sciences and Civilizations, 'East' 
and 'West': Joseph Needham and Max Weber" by Benjamin Nelson. 
There is also a paper by Stephan Toulmin with a comment by 
Ernan McMullin. 
in "Scientific Strategies and Historical Change" Toulmin argues 
that the history and sociology of science are inseparable from the 
philosophy of science. At the same time he characterizes philosophy 
of science as being concerned with "scientific rationality". He links 
the two theses as follows. The striking occasions for the exercise 
of scientific rationality are "cloudy" situations in which new con- 
cepts or approaches are established. Two things are required in order 
that new concepts be established: a person with some "authority" 
or a "reference-group" - and a "judgment" made by that person 
or group as to what new concept or approach should be adopted. 
Such judgments, though not logically derivable from "standards 
available" at the time, are none the less rational. An account of 
scientific rationality must give an account of  the emergence of 
'authorities' and their 'judgments'. But then it must be concerned 
with history, sociology, and psychology, and not be 'pure' philosophy. 
McMullin notes that Toulmin has argued for such views at much 
greater length in his book Human Understanding. In the article 
under review, at least, one important issue is glossed over: whether 
or not the influential judgments of 'reference groups' are ever 
criticizable. Is the 'winning" judgement or decision in a 'cloudy' 
situation always a rational one? If a 'wining' decision is by defini- 
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tion rational, then apparently a rational decision need not be a 
justi f ied one. (Thus McMullin, in his thoughtful commentary, says 
that Toulmin runs the risk of "separating rationality and justifi- 
cation".) If, on the other hand, influential judgments are criticizable, 
then one might expect a philosophical investigation of 'scientific 
rationality' to be concerned with canons of criticism rather than 
with psychological, sociological, or historical explanations of 
authority and the actual judgments particular scientific authorities 
have made. 
7. The book concludes with Part VII, "Unity of Science", contain- 
ing two papers. Kenneth F. Schaffner writes on "The Unity of 
Science and Theory Construction in Molecular Biology" and 
Lawrence Sklar on "The Evolution of the Problem of the Unity of 
Science". Sklar's paper is as much philosophical as historical. It is 
also brief and programmatic. He takes it that the current idea of 
"The Unity of  Science" is the idea of "the ultimate reduction of 
all theory to some most basic theory." Some claims about reduction 
raise difficult questions. For instance if one claims that xs are 
reducible to ys  insofar as they can be identified with ys, the issue 
arises "what is an identification?" Such questions are "straight- 
forwardly metaphysical". Sklar suggests that questions of  this kind 
will arise in the context of all "models of reduction". Thus if the 
"Unity of Science" thesis in philosophy gained impetus from an 
anti-metaphysical logical positivism, it now finds itself enmeshed in 
metaphysics. Here then are some philosophy of science questions 
which -pace  Toulmin perhaps - seem to be purely philosophical. 
As I said at the beginning, I cannot recommend this book as a 
whole very highly. 1 hope, however, that I have given a fairly clear 
idea of the nature of its contents. Incidentally, the book contains 
rather a large number of misprints. 
Margaret Gilbert 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104 
USA. 
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Ir LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
MATHEMATICS, CAMBRIDGE 1939, edited by Cora Diamond, 
Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1976 
1 have grave doubts as to whether this book - if one can call it 
that - was worth publishing. It is yet another collection of lecture 
notes taken by students who were present at Wittgenstein's lectures, 
this time on the foundations of mathematics, at Cambridge in 1939. 
Cora Diamond has assembled a text based on notes taken by R.G. 
Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. 
Malcolm wrote of  these lectures: "They were given without notes or 
preparation. Each lecture was new philosophical work. Wittgenstein's 
ideas did not come easily. He carried on a visible struggle with his 
thoughts." 
In her preface, Prof. Diamond acknowledges the difficulties of 
such an undertaking. For example, we are told that Bosanquet's 
notes were the fuUest but were edited and rearranged "for his own 
purposes" (p. 7). Rhees' and Malcolm's notes had ~ "minimal degree" 
of  editing and interpreting, but Malcolm's were often the briefest 
(p. 8). Smythies' notes followed the form of the original lectures 
but were "sometimes barely legible" (p. 8). Further, none of the 
four versions covered all of the 31 lectures. And in many cases, there 
are discrepancies which are "more or less considerable" (p. 8). 
Prof. Diamond states that her aim was to produce, from these four 
sets of notes, a version which is both as "readable and accurate" 
as possible (p. 8). "No single version was taken as the basic text. 
Rather, each passage is based on a comparison of all of  the available 
versions of that passage. Where two or more versions agreed in some 
point, I normally took them to be correct in that respect." But: 
"As a consequence, there are sentences to which nothing in the 
four versions corresponds" (!) (p. 8). And she confesses: "The 
accuracy of the text varies and depends to a certain extent on the 
accuracy of my ear." Also: "Many passages could have been handled 
differently" (p. 8). As a result of all this, we are told: "A great deal 
of  caution m u s t . . ,  be used before anything in the text here can be 
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taken as 'giving Wittgenstein's views' or even as giving good evidence 
for some interpretation of what he says elsewhere" (p. 9). 
When difficulties were encountered, Prof. Diamond occasionally 
calls attention to them via brief footnotes. Let me quote a few of 
them which illustrate some of the problems. 
The versions of  this passage in B [Bosanquet] and S [Smythies] 
are quite different. The text here is based on bqth; it could 
have been done very differently. (p. 20) 
B's version of the second way Lewy [a member of  the class] 
goes wrong is entirely different. The text here is based on 
what is given only very sketchily in S. (p. 20) 
This sentence is doubtful. The sentences in B and S from 
which it is constructed make slightly different points. (p. 21) 
This paragraph, based on B and S, is quite doubtful. (p. 28) 
This sentence is a combination of two quite different ones 
from M [Malcolm] and S. It is very much a guess. (p. 31) 
It would be tedious to cite any more. The point should be obvious. 
What about the lectures themselves? They are extremely dull and 
tiresomely repetitious. And most of the comments on the issues with 
which they are concerned are either trivial or are presented in a 
confusing and sketchy manner. Most are dealt with in a far better 
(if not entirely adequate) form in the Remarks on the Foundations 
o f  Mathematics (and to some extent, other works). Among them 
are: the application of mathematics, calculation, counting, criteria, 
definition, experiment and mathematics, "foundations" of mathe- 
matics, grammar, inference, logic and logical laws, meaning and 
use, measurement, necessity, numbers, proofs, experiental and 
mathematical propositions, rules, tautologies, and mathematics 
as a technique. Among the mathematicians and philosophers who are 
criticized, we find (as expected): Hardy, Hilbert, Frege, and Russell 
- the last two at great length. Since Wittgenstein's views on these 
issues and figures are well-known from the Remarks and other 
works, 1 shall not take time to re-hash them here. 
The approach which Wittgenstein takes in the lectures is also 
one which is familiar to readers of  his later works. He begins by 
asking the question: How can he (or anyone who is not a mathe- 
matician) talk about the foundations of mathematics? He says that 
he does not wish to "interfere" with the mathematicians and that 
all he is going to do is talk about a new interpretation of mathe- 
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matical symbols. He states that as a philosopher he can talk about 
mathematics because he will only deal with misunderstandings 
and "puzzles which arise from the words of our ordinary language, 
such as 'proof',  'number', 'series', 'order', etc." (p. 14). What sort 
of puzzles and misunderstandings? Those which "arise from a 
tendency to assimilate to each other expressions which have 
different functions in the language" (p. 15). He claims that he will 
try to draw attention to a certain investigation - one which might 
be called an investigation into the meanings of certain words. Or 
better yet: "The investigation is to draw your attention to facts 
you know quite as well as I, but which you have forgotten, or 
at least which are not immediately in your field of vision. They 
will all be quite trivial facts. I won't say anything which anyone 
will dispute. Or if anyone does dispute it, 1 will let that point drop 
and pass on to something else" (p. 22). They are, indeed, quite 
trivial. And (again) since most of what he says is found in the 
Remarks and other works, I shall not waste space by elaborating 
on them. But they concern the topics which I enumerated above. 
Wittgenstein seldom discusses any difficult or complex aspects of 
mathematics (or logic) nor does he say much concerning the founda- 
tions of mathematics. Hence, the title of the lectures is misleading. 
in response to the view that he was going to lecture on a "branch of 
mathematics" known as "the foundation of mathematics" he says: 
"1 am not going to lecture on this, 1 know nothing about it" (p. 14). 
In the last half of the text, however, he does discuss Russell's view 
that logic is the foundation of mathemalics and argues againsl it. 
The foundation of mathematics does not lie in the "cold and 
austere" logic of Russell but in certain "empirical facts" which 
involve us in a language game (p. 280). Both mathematics and logic 
are "part of the apparatus of language, not part of the application 
of language" (p. 250). And both mathematics and logic serve merely 
to make transitions from one "material proposition" to another 
(p. 267). Logical and mathematical propositions facilitate calcula- 
tion or inference (p. 282). 
There is one moderately interesting feature of the book. The 
editor has included comments, questions, and answers to questions 
which were made by members of the class which include: Lewy, 
Prince, Watson, Wisdom, Gasking, Malcolm, Rhees, and, above all, 
Turing, who heroically attempts to raise objections, provide answers, 
etc., - only to be (often) put down by Wittgenstein, usually in a 
cursory manner: Here are a few examples: 
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Ieittgenstein: Suppose that when we counted the squares 
we always got different results. Would the figure still be called 
a proof?. 
Turing: It would be a bad proof. 
Wittgenstein: A bad proof  of  what? It would not prove what 
result we should get if we counted the squares on a certain 
occasion. In fact, the figure would be useless for physics. 
What would it prove? Nothing. (pp. 3 7 - 3 8 )  
Wittgenstein: Suppose we place a yardstick against a metre 
rod, glue the two together and then cut off  the metre rod 
where the yardstick e n d s . . .  Can we say which is being 
measured by which? 
Turing: Probably the yardstick is being measured by the 
metre rod, as the metre rod iscut offwhere the yardstick ends. 
Wittgenstein: Oh, come now - then we will cut it of f  some- 
where in the middle. Now you cannot tell which is measured 
by which. (pp. l 17-118)  
Wittgenstein: If a contradiction may lead you into trouble, 
so may anything. It is no more likely to do so than anything 
else. 
Turing: You seem to be saying that if one uses a little common 
sense, one will not get into trouble. 
Wittgenstein: No, that is NOT what I mean at all. (p. 219) 
One final remark. The volume contains an excellent and thorough 
index. Alas, this reader - and doubtless many others - will seldom 
have occasion to use it. 
E D. Klemke 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
USA 
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Ir DOCTRINE OF THE TYRANNY OF 
LANGUAGE: A N  HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL EXAMINA- 
TION OF HIS BLUE BOOK, by S. Morris Engel, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy has often been held to be com- 
pletely original, without historical antecedents, or even a repudia- 
tion of past philosophy. Among some expositors it has been seen as 
one strand in the development of twentieth century British philos- 
ophy. In his study, Engel challenges these common views. Of course, 
several commentators (Anscombe, Stenius, Toulmin, and others) 
have already questioned or opposed these prevailing opinions. Engel 
acknowledges their efforts but seeks to go further in tracing the 
historical roots of Wittgenstein's work. The significance of this 
aspect of Engel's book is emphasized by Stephen Toulmin in his 
introduction to the volume. However, it would be misleading to say 
that Engel's book is simply an historical study. It is rather an effort 
to illuminate various aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and its relation 
to certain movements within contemporary philosophy as well as an 
effort to trace historical influences. The book, in Engel's words, 
"grows out of an attempt to understand how some philosophers 
within the linguistic movement have come to say the very strange 
things now so familiar to us. Having for a long time been puzzled 
and intrigued by them, I finally determined to discover what some 
of their origins were and what about them was so puzzling and 
intriguing to me. Although 1 soon discovered these origins in Witt- 
genstein's Blue Book, the tensions and contradictions which 1 found 
in this work, as well as Wittgenstein's differences with his disciples, 
proved to be themselves very puzzling and I set about to trace their 
roots as well" (p. xi). 
Relying upon Warnock's exposition (in English Philosophy 
Since 1900), Engel briefly describes the impact which G.E. Moore 
had upon contemporary philosophers. He states that Moore must be 
credited for being the first to ask why philosophers say such strange 
things as "Time is unreal," etc. He claims that Moore did not answer 
this question but that Wittgenstein did, and he states that he wishes 
to trace the effect which Wittgenstein's answer had upon those who 
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came under his influence. Among the latter, he distinguishes two 
groups - those who hold that the nonsensical utterances of  many 
philosophers are a function of language per se (the linguistic wing) 
and those who maintain that these strange assertions are manifesta- 
tons of  deep psychological needs (the clinical wing). According to 
Engel, although both of these "wings" stem from Wittgenstein and 
both are connected with Wittgenstein's central thesis regarding 
the way we are often led into confusion "by means of language," 
nevertheless, both have misrepresented and misunderstood Wittgen- 
stein. Hence, he proposes to examine Wittgenstein's theory regarding 
language and maintains that, since the source of its "stresses and 
strains" is in the Blue Book, his first task will be to examine that 
work. 
In a chapter entitled "The Dilemma of the 'Blue Book' ,"  Engel 
presents an exposition of some of the main themes in the book. 
Among them is Wittgenstein's view that philosophical questions - 
unlike empirical ones - are not about an "external" reality but 
rather are "either about the conceptual schema (or language) we 
use in organizing that external reality or are by-products of the 
friction brought about by conflicting schemata - that they are, in 
either case, only about language" (p. 30). Engel presents some brief 
criticisms of Wittgenstein's views but holds that these are all "over- 
shadowed" by a certain major internal difficulty or contradiction 
in the Blue Book. And what, precisely, is the dilemma of the Blue 
Book? Apparently this. There are (according to Engel) two "strands" 
in Wittgenstein's thought. According to the first, the confusions 
which are found in the writings of philosophers have their origin 
in language. The philosopher, in this view, is one who, having been 
misled by language, propounds in perplexing ways linguistic propo- 
sitions as if they were empirical or scientific ones. He is led to make 
this confusion and to utter strange things by certain misleading 
words and expressions. "In order to dispel this confusion and relieve 
the puzzlement, what we must do is to destroy 'the outward simi- 
larity' between the two propositions that are wrongly assimilated. 
This can be done by seeing 'how the words are actually used in our 
language' and thus how and where they mislead" (pp. 41-42) .  
But although this seems to be the dominant strand in the Blue Book, 
Engel finds in it another strand which is in direct conflict with the 
first. "What this new strand seems to assert is that philosophical 
puzzlement, far from being the effect of linguistic confusion is, on 
the contrary, itself the very cause of it!" How so? "Certain deep 
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dissatisfactions with language. . ,  lead the philosopher to revise it 
in ways more congenial to him" (p. 42). According to Engel, 
Wittgenstein is not clear as to just what these dissatisfactions are. 
But what is clear is that "language alone is now no longer the sole 
villain. Something else, something obviously deeper and more 
intractable is apparently responsible" (p. 42). But if Wittgenstein 
is unclear as to what these deep dissatisfactions are, Engel seems 
equally unclear. His treatment of this issue is one of the most dis- 
appointing features of  the book. Since he attaches such importance 
to this second strand, one expects a much more searching analysis 
or probing. 
Engel then turns to the question of the historical parallels and 
sources of  Wittgenstein's work - sources which have led to the 
above-mentioned stresses and strains of Wittgenstein's views. Engel 
finds these to lie chiefly in the works of  Kant and Schopenhauer, 
and he devotes a chapter to each. Engel's main thesis here is: 
Wittgenstein failed to resolve the tensions and contradictions in his 
thought because they stem from and have their antecedents in the 
historical sources from which he "gained his inspiration." The 
presence of these influences upon him drew him in conflicting 
directions, leading him to believe that, on the one hand, philo- 
sophical puzzlement is a product of  confusion (Schopenhauer), 
yet on the other hand that its source lies deep in our nature (Kant); 
that what lies beyond the area amenable to skill is nonsense 
(Schopenhauer), yet that it is an important kind of nonsense (Kant), 
and so on (p. 97). Engel chides Wittgenstein's followers for having 
failed to see that "the Wittgensteinian system" was a product 
of these "two diverse literary traditions between which it tried 
to maintain a delicate balance" (p. 98). The chief defects of Engel's 
work seem to me to be in these two chapters devoted to Kant 
and Schoperthauer. His case for Wittgenstein's indebtedness to Kant 
is rather flimsy. He spends over ten pages in pointing out that other 
writers have not shown it. But he does not adequately show it him- 
self. He puts quotes from Kant and Wittgenstein side-by-side and 
(for the most part) lets the reader see the point. Often it is difficult 
to see. Similarly, it seems to me that Engel stretches his case in 
his comparison of Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer. The citing 
of somewhat similar quotations is not enough. More elucidation 
of them is needed. Nevertheless, in both cases some interesting 
hints are given which may provide spurs for further research. 
In the last part of his study, Engel turns to a certain theme 
which appears in some of Wittgenstein's works which were written 
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shortly after the Blue Book - a theme which "promises a way out of  
the dilemma posed by that book" (p. 102). According to Engel, 
"the view which seems to emerge from these writings is that the 
mind is held captive and in bondage not by language, pure and 
simple, but rather by 'pictures' which language has a tendency to 
generate" (p. 103). Many words tend to arouse pictures of  what they 
represent. In most cases, this is helpful since it guarantees that we 
will all use the words in the same way. But in other cases (e.g., 
'particle') the pictures are misleading. When such words are put to 
new uses instead of  being used in their ordinary ways, the opposite 
effect occurs. These words are misleading because the pictures 
which they arouse in us lead us to expect the wrong things. Since an 
image is misapplied, the end result is puzzlement. Confusions arise 
when we use familiar words in unfamiliar ways. The pictures aroused 
by them are misleading, and from these "most of  the problems 
of philosophy arise" (p. 109). Engel illustrates this theme by citing 
numerous passages from unpublished works as well as from the 
Investigations, Foundations, and Brown Book. And how does Witt- 
genstein's later theory of pictures (not to be confused with the 
picture theory of the Tractatus) provide a way out of  the dilemma 
of the Blue Book? In Engel's view, Wittgenstein's earlier theory 
(in the Blue Book) does not adequately explain why language tends 
to have such a "dominating and perverse effect" upon us. It does 
not provide answers as to how "language manages to exercize 
such a tyrannically bewitching power over our minds and what 
about it enables it to continue to deceive us even when its decep- 
tions are brought to light" (p. 120). The later theory is said to make 
up this lack. Unfortunately, Engel does not show just how this is 
achieved but is content to make brief remarks such as: "This 
tendency of language to generate pictures is not only something 
universal about language but may very well be conceived as pre- 
cisely the sort of fault in it that his theory here requires" (p. 102). 
In his final chapter, Engel attempts to show that Wittgenstein 
may be regarded as a type of existentialist and that his "existen- 
tialism" and the direction to which it points lie, much more than 
what is commonly referred to as existentialism, in the direct line 
of development of western philosophy. Engei tries to establish 
this claim by such means as the following. He remarks that the 
concept of the Absurd is common to existentialists. And he cites 
some of the later passages of the Tractatus as evidence of Wittgen- 
stein's having held this concept. But he seems to interpret that 
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claim as being equivalent to the thesis that Wittgenstein held that 
the world we experience depends to a great extent on the con- 
ceptual system which we use in organizing it for ourselves and 
that in this enterprise "we are under a kind of human and uni- 
versal deception" (p. 125). Just why these two claims are held to be 
equivalent is not made clear. Nor is the transition from such matters 
to Engel's conclusion: "In stressing this aspect of  our human con- 
dition (an aspect which in its modem version is the all-embracing 
theme of Existentialism) Wittgenstein shows himself to be part 
of  this great philosophical or metaphysical tradition" (p. 125). 
This is surely a provocative thesis, but I find Engel's support for it 
to be unconvincing. 
In spite of the difficulties which I have mentioned, Engel's book 
deserves serious study. I believe that he has not successfully achieved 
his main task. But he has at least made a start toward that end. 
In the words of  Toulmin, "Professor Engel claims only to be opening 
up some of the questions which we shall all be having to pursue 
in the years ahead" (p. xii). 
E.D. Klemke 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
USA 
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PERCEPTION, EMOTION AND ACTION, by Irving Thalberg, 
Oxford: Basil BlackweU, and New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977, 142 pp. 
The five essays in this book are united by a common methodo- 
logical theme - what Thalberg calls a 'component approach', Two 
main advantages claimed for it are that it is compatible with a 
variety of metaphysical positions, and that it provides a way of 
breaking various long-standing philosophical deadlocks, twelve of 
which are discussed in the volume. 
What is meant by a component approach (or 'analysis') can best 
be illustrated by example, since Thalberg eschews any abstract 
characterization of his methodology. Consider the event of seeing 
an X. Such an event, Thalberg argues, has various ingredients - 
e.g., the X; light waves traveling from the X to the perceiver's 
eye; neural activity; beliefs acquired by the perceiver; and per- 
haps even sense-data, depending upon one's philosophical pro- 
clivities. The event in question consists of such components, and it 
would be an error either to identify the event with a sub-group 
of its components (e.g., neural impulses) or to speak of a causal 
connection between the event and any of its components - even 
though causal connections may well exist between the components 
themselves. This result is counterintuitive, however, since it does 
seem clearly correct to say that the light's traveling from X to my 
eye is a cause of my seeing X. And there is a similar consequence 
for a component analysis of emotion: we will be debarred from 
saying, e.g., that a traveler's belief that he has mislaid his pass- 
port causes him to be anxious about that matter (33-4). (I shall 
reserve until later an application of the point to action-theory.) 
Thalberg provides no necessary and sufficient conditions for 
componency, claiming that (a) we can generally identify com- 
ponents easily enough by appeal to common sense, scientific investi- 
gation, and the meanings of key terms; and (b) his program will be 
vindicated if it offers a significant alternative to other philosophical 
outlooks. But if 'being a component of X' is incompatible with 
'being a cause of X' (as Thalberg usually maintains, but see p. 29 
for a contrary insinuation), our intuitions about causes may clash 
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with or prevent any clear intuitions about components. Thus, in 
the absence of something like 'the shopworn apparatus of logically 
necessary and sufficient conditions' (115), the significance of 
Thalberg's alternative to adversative views is difficult to assess. 
The need for a criterion of componency also emerges from 
Thalberg's component approach to action. Among other things, 
he wishes to show that his view can accommodate a causal account 
of intentional action, and this requires him to handle counter- 
examples based on 'deviant' causal chains. Consider Donald David- 
son's story of the mountain climber who holds a rope from which 
his colleague is dangling helplessly. The climber is tormented by a 
desire to let go of the rope, all the while aware of the fate that his 
partner will suffer if he does so. These thoughts, however, so 
unnerve him that he lets go of the rope after all. Intuitively his 
letting go does not seem to be an intentional action, but this creates 
a problem for causal theorists who analyze intentional action as 
bodily movement produced by intentions and desires. 
The main elements in Davidson's story, Thalberg suggests, are 
these causally connected items (61): 
(i) the alpinist's longing to perform the action of relaxing 
his grip; 
(ii) his belief that if he does so, the rope and his partner will 
fall; 
(iii) his paroxysm of guilt in response to his desire and belief; 
(iv) the uncontrollable weakening of his fingers. 
Although Thalberg has several things to say about this case, 1 shall 
focus on just one of them: the question of which items on the list 
are components of the climber's action (i.e., loosening his grip). 
Thalberg argues that (iv) is not a component of that action, since 
'The bodily movement reported by Davidson seems too much like 
twitching, shuddering, tremors and other movements which occur 
whether or not one wants them' (61). Hence, if some version of a 
causal theory of intentional action is to survive, (iv) must be 
replaced by: 
(iv') the relaxing of the fingers. 
This is said to differ from such things as shudders and twitches 
in that it is 'supposed to be a movement within the person's reper- 
tory, or at least not one that may elude his control' (61). And now 
at least we see the climber doing the very thing he wanted to do, 
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so Davidson's story no longer obviously describes a non-intentional 
action. Despite Thalberg's claim to the contrary, however, the com- 
ponent account now appears circular. For what is a 'movement 
within a person's repertory'  or 'one not eluding his control '  except a 
controlled movement or action? Clearly, however, it is not  enlighten- 
ing to say that one mark of  an action is a bodily movement which 
is an action. Thus, Thalberg"s causal account is left with the problem 
of  specifying what sort of  bodily movements are components of  
action. 
in Thalberg's view actions (or more precisely, basic actions) are 
never anything over and above their causally connected constituents. 
(Non-basic actions for him may consist o f  components,  some of  
which are not causally connected, but that is irrelevant for the 
present.) Intentions and desires (perhaps identical with some neural 
processes), along with neural feedback mechanisms, bring about 
bodily movement; together these items constitute an action. But 
such a deterministic scheme, it has often been argued, threatens 
freedom of  action. Thalberg's initial response to the determinist 
is as follows: 
If what we do is to result - inevitably - from electro-chemical 
processes within our nervous system, then it must be a sep- 
arate occurrence. The movement of  the rest of  our body is 
easy to distinguish from events in our cerebral cortex and its 
peripheral extensions. But if we introduce a constituent anal- 
ysis, our action will encompass both a bodily movement and 
neural processes. The whole action cannot therefore result 
from one of  its ingredient events. Consequently, we will be 
unable to raise the specter of  our own brain processes making 
our actions unfree. (74). 
This reply, however, shows at most that our actions cannot causally 
or inevitably result from those neural processes which are their 
constituents. Now, let A be an action (e.g., moving my finger) 
whose constituents are c l . . . C n .  Presumably these constituents 
are part o f  a longer causal chain whose earlier members are not con- 
stituents of  A. Since these earlier members are causally responsible 
for cl . . .  c n, and hence for A, it looks as if there is no room for 
free (uncaused) action. So far, then, Thalberg's contention 'that no 
problem arises if we regard some concurrent brain processes as 
neural components of  what a person does'  (71) has not been vindi- 
cated. The only other argument he offers on the subject is this: 
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We simply disavow any claim to have analysed basic action - 
or any other kind of action - in a way that yields the 'essence' 
of agency . . .  In a sense, the agent himself does not figure 
in our narrative of what goes on when he acts. So he is neither 
active nor passive in the proceedings. (128) 
Notice, however, that here the problem of free action has given 
way to a problem about the freedom of agents. And while I agree 
that an account of action need not yield an analysis of agency, 
this concession will not circumvent deterministic arguments against 
free action. 
Another goal of Thalberg's component approach is to put to rest 
a dispute in action-theory between Reductive Unifiers, who identify 
basic actions with their attendant results, and Pluralists, who see 
basic actions as numerically distinct from their generated conse- 
quences. Accordingly, he accepts the following propositions (cf. 
p. 120): 
( I )  Basic actions are actions; 
(2) Non-basic actions are actions; 
(3) They are not the same action; 
(4) They are not different actions. 
Although propositions (3) and (4) seem mutually exclusive, Thal- 
berg's strategy is to assert that (4) is nothing more than a denial 
of the Pluralists's outlook. There is still room to maneuver, he 
submits, between that denial and an acceptance of the Reductive 
Unifier's position. The main idea is that basic actions are com- 
ponents of non-basic actions; and when X is a component of Y, 
the disjunction 'Either X is identical with Y, or else X and Y are 
numerically distinct' fails to apply. This is an interesting proposal, 
one which does suggest a useful alternative to the views represented 
in the aforementioned dispute. Nevertheless, it must face two 
difficulties. First, the examples of componency which Thalberg 
provides do not yield an account of the relation 'is a component 
of '  clear enough to warrant an authoritative evaluation of the 
proposal at hand; and the revelation that there can be components 
of  action which are not causally connected with one another 
(89-92) makes several of his analogies rather dubious. Second, 
an unwelcome consequence of the component approach here is 
that it forces us to forego many of our usual causal explanations 
of action. For Thalberg, (1) a desire to smoke a cigarette, may 
cause (2) a variety of bodily movements which result in (3) a 
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lighted cigarette's being in my mouth;  but since (1 ) - (3 )  are com- 
ponents of  the (non-basic) action (smoking a cigarette), it follows 
that my desire to smoke cannot be a cause o f  my smoking. (The 
same point applies to explanations of  basic actions.) This con- 
sequence can be avoided by Pluralists like Alvin Goldman - Thal- 
berg's primary Pluralist adversary - but unfortunately, Thalberg 
argues much more effectively against Reductive Unifiers than de 
does against Pluralists. 
In spite of  the reservations recorded above, I do think that the 
component approach deserves elaboration and refinement (per- 
haps unavoidably along the traditional lines of  necessary and suffi- 
cient conditions). Moreover, many of  Thalberg's arguments against 
other philosophical views are persuasive, and his style is lively and 
free from unnecessary technical detail. Taken in conjunction with 
some traditional literature on these topics, Perception, Emotion 
and Action would make a useful text in an advanced undergraduate 
or graduate course. The book contains numerous typographical 
errors but none of  them affects its intelligibility.* 
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